Military–Security Stabilisation in Sudan-From Truce to Ceasefire

Military–Security Stabilisation in Sudan: From Truce to Ceasefire

A Policy Paper for the Quartet (1)

By Professor Mekki El ShiblyExecutive Director, Cognisance Centre for Strategic Studies

Executive Summary

This policy paper outlines a sequenced pathway for stabilising Sudan’s conflict environment through an integrated Truce–Ceasefire Phase. The approach is pragmatic: it recognises both the zones of relative calm and the hotspots of intense fighting (Darfur and Kordofan), addresses the persistent failures of past truces, and establishes mechanisms for credible Quartet involvement. The ultimate goal is to create a secure foundation for civilian–constitutional transition by neutralising spoilers, ensuring humanitarian access, initiating verifiable steps toward military integration, and identifying and mitigating possible risks.

I. Objectives

1. Immediate Humanitarian Access: Establish safe humanitarian corridors within 2–3 weeks of truce declaration.
2. Stabilisation of Battlefronts: Freeze frontlines, separate forces, and reduce civilian casualties.
3. Confidence-Building: Create a credible monitoring framework with Quartet oversight and AU/IGAD observers, which was missed by the Jeddah initiative.
4. Spoiler Management: Prevent Islamist and militia actors from undermining agreements.
5. Linkage to Transition: Lay the security foundations for a civilian-led constitutional process.
6. Risks Identification: Identify possible national, regional, and international risks and suggest mitigation measures.

II. Time Frame

• Month 1–3 (Truce Period): Humanitarian truce, relief corridors, confidence-building measures.
• Month 4–9 (Ceasefire Period): Formal ceasefire, Quartet-led monitoring, initial redeployment and integration timetable.
• Beyond Month 9: Gradual transition into the Civilian–Constitutional Phase.

III. Facilitation of Truce and Ceasefire Negotiations

A critical lesson from the failure of previous initiatives, particularly the Jeddah process, is that negotiations between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) require both credible mediation and domestic ownership. To achieve this balance, the Quartet’s facilitation must be complemented by Sudanese independent civil society, especially research-based think tanks with proven neutrality and expertise.

A. Key Principles for Facilitation:

• Exclusion of Politicians at the Truce–Ceasefire Phase: Political actors remain highly fragmented and are not in a position to provide enforceable guarantees. Their involvement at this early stage risks politicising and derailing security negotiations.
• Role of Think Tanks: National think tanks provide impartial expertise, including conflict mapping, ceasefire design, verification methodologies, and risk analysis. Their technical input ensures that agreements are practical and context-specific, with a higher chance of sustainability.
• Quartet’s Leverage: The Quartet (US, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, UAE, UK, with AU and IGAD support) must act as guarantor and enabler, providing diplomatic pressure, resources, and monitoring capacity while leaving the technical structuring of the truce/ceasefire to neutral experts.

B. Proposed Facilitation Architecture:

1. Quartet Mediation Platform:
   • Quartet convenes SAF and RSF delegations.
   • Establishes negotiation protocol and timelines.
   • Provides third-party monitoring resources and guarantees of neutrality.
2. Technical Advisory Group (TAG):
   • Composed of Sudanese independent think tanks and civil society experts.
   • Provides evidence-based proposals on:
     • Mapping zones of calm vs. active conflict.
     • Phased truce modalities and humanitarian corridors.
     • Verification and monitoring mechanisms.
   • Reports jointly to the Quartet mediation team.
3. Outcome Linkage to Constitutional Track:
   • Agreements reached in the truce and ceasefire phase will be handed over to the civilian–constitutional track, once unified civilian representation (FFC) is achieved.
   • Ensures a clear sequencing: military settlement first, political transition second.

C. Benefits of this Approach:

• Enhances the legitimacy of the process by grounding it in Sudanese expertise.
• Shields the talks from political fragmentation while maintaining civilian oversight.
• Ensures technical robustness in designing and monitoring the truce.
• Provides the Quartet with credible national partners that are independent from both warring parties and political elites.

IV. Mechanism of Implementation

A. Differentiated Zone Approach

• Zones of Relative Calm (Khartoum peripheries, Central, Northern & Eastern Sudan)
  • Implement immediate local truces, monitored through community liaison committees with Quartet backing.
  • Open humanitarian corridors and facilitate returns of displaced populations.
• Zones of Intense Fighting (Darfur, Kordofan)
  • Deploy Quartet-supported hybrid monitoring missions with AU (Eastern Africa Standby Force-EASF), EU participation involving a satellite observation mechanism.
  • Establish demilitarised humanitarian “safe zones” around key towns (Nyala, El Fasher, Kadugli).
  • Initiate phased disengagement of SAF and RSF, sequenced by hotspot.

B. Command and Monitoring Structure

• Quartet Mediation Cell: A joint mechanism led by the US and Saudi Arabia, with AU and IGAD embedded.
• Civil Society Liaison Units: Independent Sudanese observers (think tanks, humanitarian organisations) feeding reports into Quartet mechanisms.
• Verification Teams: Mixed monitors drawn from AU, IGAD, and neutral African states.

C. Operational Mechanism

V. Estimated Costs and Financing Plan

A. Cost and Sources of Funds

• Estimated Truce–Ceasefire Phase Costs (9 months):
  • Monitoring & Verification Missions: $120 million.
  • Humanitarian Corridors & Logistics: $180 million.
  • Civil Society Liaison/Local Committees: $20 million.
  • Total: $320 million.
• Potential Financing Sources:
  • Quartet pooled fund led by the US, EU, and Saudi Arabia.
  • UN-managed trust fund with earmarked contributions from the UAE, UK, and regional partners.

Breakdown of Costs (6 months)

B. Financing Mechanism

• Establish a Quartet Trust Fund for Sudan Stabilisation (QTFS) managed by UNDP.
• Contributions:
  • US and EU: bulk humanitarian and monitoring costs.
  • Saudi Arabia and UAE: contingency and humanitarian air bridge.
  • UK & Norway: civil society/local monitors.
• Reporting: Quarterly public financial reports to ensure transparency.

VI. Spoiler Management

A. Islamist Spoilers

• Political Isolation: Explicit Quartet stance against inclusion of Islamist factions in truce/ceasefire talks.
• Financial Sanctions: Freeze assets of Islamist networks financing proxy militias.
• Security Measures: Exclude Islamist-aligned militias (e.g., Popular Defence Forces remnants) from ceasefire frameworks.

B. Other Militias and Criminal Networks

• Incentivise disarmament with humanitarian access and development aid.
• Criminalise interference with humanitarian corridors under the Quartet sanctions framework.

VII. Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E)

A. Key Performance Indicators (KPIs):

1. Humanitarian Assistance Flow: Measured by volume of aid delivered and number of civilians reached.
2. Civilian Protection: Reduction in reported civilian casualties in Darfur and Kordofan.
3. Compliance Rate: Number of verified ceasefire violations per month.
4. Redeployment Progress: SAF–RSF disengagement benchmarks achieved.
5. Spoiler Neutralisation: Islamist-aligned actors excluded from official processes.

M&E reports are to be published monthly by the Quartet, with summaries shared publicly to sustain credibility.

VIII. Linkage to the Civilian Phase

The success of the Truce–Ceasefire Phase directly enables the Civilian–Constitutional Phase. Specifically:

• Verified ceasefire compliance builds trust for civilian leaders to negotiate constitutional amendments.
• Safe humanitarian access stabilises communities, facilitating eventual voter registration and participation.
• Isolation of Islamist spoilers creates political space for the FFC and broader civilian coalitions to unify.

IX. Risks and Mitigation

A. National Risks

1. Islamist Spoilers and Parallel Militias
   • Risk: Islamist networks and aligned militias may actively sabotage truces to block SAF–RSF compromise.
   • Mitigation: Explicit Quartet monitoring of all armed groups, targeted sanctions, and embedding the isolation of Islamist spoilers in the truce/ceasefire agreements.
2. Fragmentation within SAF and RSF
   • Risk: Splinter groups or commanders reject agreements, leading to local flare-ups.
   • Mitigation: Internal command verification, confidence-building measures, and pressure from external guarantors on both leaderships.
3. Humanitarian Access Obstruction
   • Risk: Warring parties use aid corridors as bargaining chips.
   • Mitigation: Establish demilitarised humanitarian corridors monitored by neutral actors (UN/WFP).

B. Regional Risks

1. Cross-Border Arms Flows (Libya, Chad, South Sudan, CAR)
   • Risk: Continued supply of weapons undermines the truce.
   • Mitigation: Quartet and AU pressure on neighbouring states to tighten borders; joint border monitoring taskforce.
2. Egypt–UAE Divergence
   • Risk: Cairo may favour SAF dominance, while Abu Dhabi hedges with RSF; this rivalry risks undermining Quartet unity.
   • Mitigation: Integrate both into the Quartet framework with a clear division of roles, stressing neutrality and humanitarian primacy.
3. Refugee Spillovers
   • Risk: Large-scale displacement destabilises Chad, South Sudan, and Egypt.
   • Mitigation: Early humanitarian financing window coordinated by UNHCR and Quartet.

C. International Risks

1. Quartet Coordination Failures
   • Risk: Divergent approaches between the US, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, UAE, AU, and IGAD.
   • Mitigation: Regular Quartet coordination mechanism with one unified monitoring cell.
2. Funding Gaps for Truce Implementation
   • Risk: Without a financing plan, monitoring, and humanitarian corridors collapse.
   • Mitigation: Create a Sudan Stabilisation Fund, pooling contributions from the Quartet, EU, and IFIs (World Bank trust fund model).
3. Overextension of UN/AU Peacekeeping
   • Risk: Past experiences (e.g., UNAMID) show mandate overstretch.
   • Mitigation: Learner mission with precise tasks: truce monitoring, corridor protection, reporting.

Risk–Mitigation Matrix for Truce and Ceasefire Implementation

XI. Conclusion

An integrated Truce–Ceasefire Phase offers the only viable foundation for Sudan’s stabilisation. The Quartet’s leadership is essential: not only to mediate agreements but to finance, monitor, and enforce compliance, while isolating spoilers who thrive in chaos. If implemented with precision and determination, this phase can transform Sudan’s battlefield stalemate into a political opportunity for a durable, civilian-led transition.